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ABSTRACT: In medical consultation, it is the doctor’s task to advise patients about health related
problems. This advice might not immediately be acceptable to the patient, for instance, because he has to
drastically change his behaviour. In such cases, the doctor could attempt to make the advice acceptable by
providing argumentation. To analyse and evaluate argumentation in medical consultation, I will argue in
this paper that, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, medical consultation could be analysed as a
communicative activity type.
KEYWORDS: communicative activity type, doctor-patient communication, medical consultation, pragmadialectical analysis.

1. INTRODUCTION
In medical consultation, it is the doctor’s task to advise patients about health related
problems. Such advice—or the reasons for it—might not immediately be acceptable to
the patient: the patient might have to drastically change his behaviour, he might be
diagnosed with a life-threatening disease, or his symptoms might be medically
unexplainable. An important way in which the doctor can nonetheless attempt to make
his recommendations acceptable is by means of argumentation. A doctor could, for
example, recommend a change of diet by arguing that the patient’s cells do not properly
respond to insulin and, hence, the level of glucose in his blood has to be steadied by
controlling food intake.
Yet, the context of a medical consultation does not just enable the doctor to
present argumentation in support of his advice; it also affects the way in which the doctor
provides this argumentation. Medical care has become increasingly complex due to the
development of more and more advanced treatment options, while patients are not always
able to completely understand what these options amount to. Even so, the legal doctrine
of informed consent requires doctors in various countries 1 to fully inform patients about
the reasons for the diagnosis or advised treatment option(s), alternative treatment
option(s) and consequences of refraining from treatment altogether. As the doctor has to
1
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accomplish these tasks while simultaneously attempting to make his advice acceptable in
the limited time of the consultation, his argumentation can be expected to significantly
differ from that in, say, informal interpersonal argumentative exchanges.
In this paper, I will argue that, to analyse and evaluate argumentative discourse in
medical consultation, such a consultation could be analysed as a communicative activity
type based on the pragma-dialectical theory. More specifically, I will discuss how the
characteristics of a medical consultation affect the strategic manoeuvring by the doctor
and patient.
2. PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY TYPES
To examine argumentative discourse in medical consultation, let me first discuss the way
in which context can be taken into account when analysing discourse in general. As one
of the first to study linguistic anthropology (instead of anthropological linguistics),
Hymes (1977, p. 3) argues that “one needs to investigate directly the use of language in
contexts of situation, so as to discern patterns proper to speech activity.” He introduces
the concept of speech event to denote activities that have distinctive speech patterns. 2
This concept might come in handy when evaluating discourse. It allows us to make a
distinction between the evaluations of, for example, a joke in an informal conversation
and the same joke in a mediation session.
However, a difficulty with Hymes’s idea of a speech event is that it can be used to
refer to both a type of rule-governed speech pattern and an instance of such a pattern. So,
‘an informal conversation’ could just as well be called a speech event as ‘an informal
conversation at friend X’s birthday party.’ This blend of speech pattern types and speech
pattern tokens in Hymes’s notion might become problematic in the analysis and
evaluation of discourse. Moreover, especially for evaluating discourse, it is important to
take the goal of the interlocutors’ interaction into account. Are they, for instance, trying
to inform or to convince each other? As Hymes does not relate his concept of speech
event to the goal of the discourse, it is better to amend it for analysing argumentative
discourse in specific contexts.
In such an analysis, we could take Levinson’s (see 1979; also reproduced in 1992)
concept of activity type into account. According to Levinson, an activity type is a “fuzzy
category whose focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events
with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of
allowable contributions” (Levinson 1992, p. 69). His idea of an activity type therefore
differs from Hymes’s speech event in that it is goal dependent and encompasses also
activities that do not involve speech. Although the goal-dependency of Levinson’s
activity type would be useful for evaluating discourse, the fact that it constitutes—as
Levinson admits—a “fuzzy category” makes his notion of activity types somewhat
unsuitable for discourse analysis and evaluation.
When examining argumentative discourse, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (see
2005; and 2006) nonetheless make use of a concept that might seem similar to Levinson’s
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activity type: the communicative activity type 3 . However, they specify this concept by
regarding communicative activity types as culturally established communicative practices
that have become more or less conventionalised, as they are to a certain degree
institutionalised. Contrast, for example, the way in which the highly institutionalised
witness examination in a court room affects the communication between the participants
with a much more loosely institutionalised journalistic interview. Van Eemeren (to be
published) furthermore distinguishes between communicative activity types and instances
of these activity types. He specifically regards the ‘communicative activity type’ to
concern—as the term indicates—the type of conventionalised communicative practice
(such as ‘presidential debate’) and the ‘speech event’ the token of such a practice (such as
‘the first General Election Presidential Debate between McCain and Obama’).
In some communicative activity types, argumentation plays a vital role. This is,
for instance, the case in presidential debates and arbitration. The communicative activity
type can then be expected to shape the contributions by the discussion parties. In other
words, it “discipline[s] the conduct of strategic manoeuvring” by the parties (Van
Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006, p. 385), which is due to the fact that they have to take into
account the activity type’s rules and conventions when striving to balance their dialectical
aim of reasonably resolving the difference of opinion with their rhetorical aim of winning
the discussion. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (see 2005, p. 77; and 2006, p. 384) list four
preconditions for strategic manoeuvring that differ in such communicative activity types.
Because the pragma-dialectical communicative activity type is a relatively clear concept
and the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring directly link argumentative discourse to
the activity type, examining these preconditions in medical consultation might prove
useful for the analysis and evaluation of the argumentation that occurs in it.
3. MEDICAL CONSULTATION AS A COMMUNICATIVE ACTIVITY TYPE
Before the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring can be specified for medical
consultation, it has to be established whether this practice can be analysed as a
communicative activity type and, if so, what role argumentation plays in this activity
type. Medical consultation can be seen as an institutionalised communicative practice
between a doctor and patient. It only occurs in assigned places (such as hospitals or
community health centres) and is regulated by institutions (such as departments of health
and medical professional associations).
Moreover, medical consultation is conducted in a more or less conventionalised
fashion. The doctor generally starts out by asking after the health of the patient, the
patient responds to this question by discussing his health related problem and, in so
doing, requests the doctor’s advice about this problem, the doctor then examines the
patient and, based on this examination and his general medical knowledge, advises the
patient. Following Heath (see 1986), Ten Have (see 1991, p. 139) summarises this
organisation of medical consultation by regarding it to normally consist of complaint
presentation, verbal and physical examination, diagnosis, treatment, prescription and/or
advice.
3
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Mohammed 2008).

3

ROOSMARYN PILGRAM
During this conventionalised conversation, the doctor will try to minimise a
patient’s anxiety or uncertainty by delivering his advice in a reassuring manner. Tuckett,
Boulton, Olson and Williams (1985, p. 7) state that the doctor “is likely to give
information to the patient not only about what he suffers, but at the same time about how
it came about, what is to blame, what will happen, and what should be done.” The
medical consultation consequently affects the communication between the participants. A
doctor would go about differently when informally discussing a health related problem—
say at home with a family member—than in a consultation. In a similar vein, of course,
the patient would discuss his health related problem differently under these circumstances
as well. We can therefore speak of the communicative activity type of medical
consultation.
To see how this activity type affects the doctor-patient communication, it is
necessary to be more precise about the meaning of the term ‘medical consultation.’
According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, a medical consultation is “a
deliberation between physicians on a case or its treatment.” However, this is not the kind
of consultation that I have in mind. My use of the term ‘medical consultation’ is more in
line with the definition that The Free Medical Dictionary provides next to the one from
Merriam-Webster, namely: “The seeing of a patient by a general practitioner.” We can
even be more specific, by emphasising the goal, means and setting of such a consultation.
In addition, we can broaden the definition by speaking of a ‘doctor’ instead of a ‘general
practitioner,’ for a medical specialist could just as well provide a medical consultation.
So, a medical consultation is a communicative doctor-patient interaction in which the
patient seeks the professional advice of a doctor about a health related problem in
assigned places (such as hospitals or community health centres). Such consultations do
not solely have to consist of just the advice by a doctor, but they characteristically also
include a diagnosis and sometimes even a prognosis about the patient’s health related
problem. Seeking and providing advice is nevertheless the consultation’s main point:
medical consultations do simply not occur without the patient’s initiative to seek the
doctor’s advice and the doctor’s willingness to attempt to provide it.
Although the patient seeks the doctor’s professional advice, that does not
necessarily mean that he always, immediately and fully seems to accept this advice once
it is given. This could be because of the fact that patients usually experience the
symptoms of their health related problem for some time before requesting a medical
consultation (see Tuckett, Boulton, Olson and Williams 1985, p. 11). Until the
consultation, a patient can cope by consulting friends, relatives, colleagues and the like.
Besides, with the considerable amount of medical information on the Internet, a patient
can request a medical consultation after gathering information online. Once a doctor’s
diagnosis, prognosis and/or advice contradict(s) these previously formed ideas, the
patient might request a justification by the doctor.
On the other hand, the doctor could also simply assume that the patient is hesitant
about accepting or following the medical advice. He could then provide argumentation,
even if the patient is not actually expecting it. A doctor might additionally feel compelled
to do so from a legal point of view. By adequately arguing in favour of his advice, he
could practically reduce his professional liability, which might be valuable given the
substantial frequency with which medical malpractice litigation occurs (see Bal 2009).
Schulz and Rubinelli (2006, n.p.) even go as far as to say that “it is probably not an

4

PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL CONSULTATION
exaggeration to claim that argumentation is actually the only instrument at a doctor’s
disposal that makes a reasoned compliance of the patient possible, where the patient takes
a certain course of action advised by a doctor because s/he has understood and believes in
the inner motivation behind it.” In any case, we can analyse the medical consultation as a
communicative activity type in which argumentation may play an important role.
4. PRECONDITIONS
CONSULTATION

FOR

STRATEGIC

MANOEUVRING

IN

MEDICAL

Now that the medical consultation has been analysed as a communicative activity type
that lends itself to argumentative discourse, the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring
in this activity type can be specified to determine how the consultation affects the
argumentative discourse that occurs in it. According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (see
2005, p. 77; and 2006, p. 384), the combination of the following four preconditions is
unique for every activity type: (i) the activity’s confrontational trigger, (ii) its starting
points, (iii) the discursive means used in the activity and (iv) its possible outcomes. 4 To
analyse a discussion party’s strategic manoeuvring, it is therefore handy to take a look at
these preconditions for the activity that the discussion party is engaged in.
Let me illustrate this by briefly discussing the genre of activity types that pragmadialectics calls negotiation. Argumentative discourse that occurs in negotiation starts out
with (i) a conflict of interest. There are usually two parties, each of them interested in
something the other has to offer. This interest is, however, self-motivated and does not
seem to be appealing to the other party on first blush. When making explicit their
interests, the negotiation parties can hence be expected to manoeuvre strategically in a
way that diminishes the conflicting nature of their interests. The (ii) starting points in
negotiations are semi-explicit constitutive rules, and sets of conditional and changeable
explicit concessions. Here, semi-explicit rules should be understood as statements like
“negotiation only occurs if interlocutors bargain,” which might or might not be made
explicit during a negotiation session. Furthermore, in a negotiation, a party could
tactically begin with a demand for an extremely high counter-offer and then gradually
lower this demand to make his own offer look more appealing. When employing such a
strategy, the negotiation party manoeuvres strategically by changing his set of conditional
concessions. As his (iii) discursive means, the party could employ argumentation
incorporated in exchanges of offers, counter-offers and other commissives. A negotiation
party could, for example, strategically make use of these means by presenting an offer as
a package deal. The (iv) possible outcomes of these exchanges are a conclusion of the
4

It should be noted that Walton (see 2008, p. 8) discusses somewhat similar distinctive features for
dialogue types; the dialogue’s initial situation, its goal, the goal of the participants and the different
procedural rules for achieving these goals. Except for information-seeking dialogues, Walton’s idea of a
dialogue’s initial situation is similar to the activity type’s confrontational trigger in pragma-dialectics, and
Walton’s different procedural rules are included in the pragma-dialectical starting points. Furthermore, the
goals of the dialogue and its participants that Walton mentions are, in terms of pragma-dialectics, the
dialectical and rhetorical aims that lead to strategic manoeuvring. In this paper, I will nevertheless refer to
the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, since they encompass only those features that are inherent to
the argumentative activity and also include, for example, the material starting points and the discursive
means used in the activity—both of which are essential to argumentative discourse and could vary per
communicative activity type.
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conflict by means of a compromise between the parties as mutually accepted agreement
or a return to the initial situation. An overview of these preconditions can be found in
Figure 1.

Figure 1
Preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse in negotiation and
medical consultation (based on Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005, p. 79)
(Genre
of)
Communicative
Activity Types

(i) Confrontational
Trigger

(ii) Starting Points
(Material,
Procedural)

(iii)
Discursive
Means Used

(iv)
Possible
Outcomes

Negotiation

conflict
of
interests; decision
up to the parties

semi-explicit
constitutive rules;
set of conditional
and
changeable
explicit
concessions

argumentation
incorporated
in
exchanges
of
offers,
counteroffers and other
commissives

conclusion
by
compromise
parties as mutually
accepted
agreement
(or
return to initial
situation)

Medical
consultation

(assumed) lack of
agreement
between a doctor
and patient about
(part
of)
the
doctor’s
advice
concerning
the
patient’s
health
related problem;
decision up to the
parties

explicit rules (e.g.,
informed consent);
implicit rules (e.g.,
the doctor acts as
discussion leader);
explicitly
established
concessions (e.g.,
a doctor’s verbal
inquiry after the
patient’s health);
implicitly
established
concessions (e.g.,
a doctor’s physical
examination of the
patient)

argumentation
based
on
interpretation of
concessions
in
terms of medical
facts and evidence;
conveyed
in
cooperative
conversational
exchanges

agreement
between the doctor
and patient about
the
patient
following
the
discussed medical
advice; and / or
referring
the
patient
to
a
specialist; and / or
a request for a
second opinion (no
return to initial
situation)

In a similar vein, we could specify in which ways medical consultation shapes the
strategic manoeuvring by a doctor and patient. This does not only provide insight into the
opportunities and constraints that the consultation presents to these interlocutors, but also
enables us to be more specific about the soundness criteria that apply to the evaluation of
their argumentative discourse. Let me therefore start by discussing the confrontational
trigger in medical consultation. In such a consultation, there is (i) a lack of agreement
between the doctor and patient about the doctor’s medical advice or the doctor assumes
that his patient hesitates to fully accept or follow the medical advice. This (assumed) lack
of agreement could not only consist of the patient’s hesitation to adopt the doctor’s
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advice or accept parts of it (such as a diagnosis), but also of real opposition by the patient
to (parts of) the advice.
Whether and how the lack of agreement between a doctor and patient can be
overcome in medical consultation is up to both discussion parties. Each of them could, in
principle, provide arguments in favour or against the medical advice, and (partly) retract
their advice, doubt or opposition. It is nevertheless important to note here that a (ii)
starting point in medical consultation is that the doctor acts as discussion leader and he is,
in this respect, more influential in the manner in which the lack of agreement is
overcome. In medical consultation, it is typical that the doctor and patient differ in the
amount of knowledge they posses about health related issues. Although doctor-patient
communication has shifted from a ‘paternalistic’ approach to a ‘patient-centred’ one since
the early 1970s (see Bensing et al. 2006; Goodnight 2006, p.79; and Zandbelt 2006, p.
10), this disparity in knowledge still means that the doctor largely determines how the
consultation proceeds. Even so, the doctor has to obtain the patient’s agreement on his
proposed medical advice, which makes the patient the more influential party in
determining whether actual agreement is acquired during the consultation.
A variety of other (ii) starting points affect the argumentative discussion between
a doctor and patient as well. To present a systematic overview of these starting points, the
pragma-dialectical distinction between procedural and material starting points comes in
handy. According to the pragma-dialectical theory, the discussion parties’ commitments
should be reconstructed as either procedural or material starting points in a critical
discussion. Procedural starting points concern the discussion rules and the division of the
burden of proof, while material starting points consist of propositions that the discussants
may use in their argumentation (see Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p.60). The
starting points that have been discussed so far—the doctor acting as discussion leader and
his obligation to obtain the patient’s agreement—are examples of (implicit) procedural
starting points.
Other procedural starting points in medical consultation are explicitly stated rules
such as the legal requirement of informed consent (see, for example, the Canadian
Supreme Court’s decision in Reibl v. Hughes [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880 for relevant case law,
and the Dutch civil code’s Wet op de geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst [Law on
the medical treatment agreement], 1995, Art. 448 for relevant legislation). Additionally,
the pragma-dialectical theory states that the division of the burden of proof belongs to the
procedural starting points. This division depends on the kind of roles that the participants
fulfil in the discussion. Since the doctor has to advise the patient about a health related
problem, he can be regarded as the protagonist in the discussion with the patient. The
doctor incurs the burden of proof for his advice by presenting it. The patient can be said
to perform the role of the antagonist: he at least seems to hesitate about accepting or
following the doctor’s medical advice.
In practice, a patient might also feel the need to give reasons as to why he requests
some of the doctor’s time. A patient could, for instance, argue why the issue about which
he asks the doctor’s advice constitutes a problem, why he thinks this problem is health
related and/or why he could not come up with a solution for it himself. Although a doctor
cannot refuse a patient’s request in his professional capacity, the patient assumes the
doctor is not fully convinced of the necessity of looking into his problem. This means that
the patient acts as a protagonist, while the doctor is to be the antagonist. Such a situation
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does, however, not always occur and, if it does, it only functions as a prelude to what is
really at stake: the doctor’s advice. Indeed, Goodnight (2006, p.79) points out that
“doctors and patients are protagonists and antagonists. When reasons matter most, the
doctor proposes, the patient disposes.”
In any case, to adequately fulfil their discussion roles, the doctor and patient have
to establish the propositions that they can use in their argumentative discourse: their
material starting points. They can again implicitly or explicitly establish these starting
points. For instance, to provide the patient with medical advice about his health related
problem, the doctor might need to physically examine the patient. Through such an
examination, the doctor obtains facts about the health of his patient. If the doctor and
patient proceed to have a discussion about the doctor’s medical advice, these facts can
function in a manner similar to the concessions in dialectical approaches to
argumentation. 5 They can, hence, be used as internal proof in the discussion, even if they
have remained implicit in the consultation so far (as in ‘You really should quit smoking.
The spirometer showed your lung capacity is far too small’). The doctor also verbally
examines the patient. From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the doctor then explicitly
establishes material starting points.
Certain material starting points in medical consultation are not established during
the consultation itself, but introduced into the consultation. A clear-cut example of a
starting point that could function as external proof in an argumentative discussion
between a doctor and patient is medical knowledge. The doctor could, for instance,
introduce the patient to new scientific insights into the patient’s health related problem or
the patient could draw the doctor’s attention to medical claims on the Internet about this
problem. Another example of a starting point that is not established in consultation itself
is the fact that the doctor can be regarded as the authority on the patient’s health related
problem. It is exactly this authority that makes the patient seek the doctor’s advice.
As their (iii) discursive means, the doctor and patient can provide argumentation
based on these material starting points. More specifically, the doctor and patient could
present argumentation based on the interpretation of concessions in terms of medical
facts and evidence. Unlike argumentation in negotiation, the discussion parties cannot
(easily) change their starting points to make their argumentation more effective. Once
physical examination shows that a patient suffers from hypertension, it is difficult for him
to argue that this is not the case simply to be more effective in opposing the doctor’s
advice. Furthermore, the advice of the doctor has to be based on medical facts and
evidence; the potential seriousness of a health related problem does not allow for sheer
guesswork.
For analysing and evaluating the strategic manoeuvring in medical consultation, it
is also important to note that a doctor and patient convey their argumentation in
cooperative conversational exchanges. This, in principle, means that they can directly
react to the one another whenever utterances are unclear or unacceptable. Indeed several
5 Dialectical approaches to argumentation characteristically regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if
the defence is performed ex concessu: a standpoint can only be proven tenable based on the concessions
(also referred to as commitments) of the discussants. For instance, Hamblin (see 1970, p.263) introduces
the notion of the discussants’ ‘commitment-store’ and deems it necessary for “the operation of a
satisfactory dialectical system.” Barth and Krabbe (see 1982, pp.56-68) adopt a similar concept, the
discussants’ ‘set of concessions’ in their formal dialectical theory.
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studies show that patients rarely ask their doctor for clarification, explanation or
information about his advice (see Bensing et al., 2006; Robinson, 2003; and Ten Have,
1991). An explanation for these findings could be that the cooperative face-to-face
conversational manner in which a doctor and patient convey their argumentation
increases the importance of politeness considerations (avoiding face threatening acts) and
sequence organisation (presenting adequate adjacency pair parts). As a result, in stark
contrast with activity types such as presidential debate, each discussion party will
manoeuvre strategically in such a way that limits the other party’s potential face loss.
Once the argumentative discussion in medical consultation has come to an end,
the (iv) outcome could be agreement between the discussion parties about the patient
following the doctor’s medical advice. If the doctor has made his advice sufficiently
acceptable to the patient, this agreement comes down to the explicit commitment by the
patient to following the advice. If the doctor has been unable or unsuccessful in making
his advice sufficiently acceptable to the patient, he could refer the patient to a specialist
or the patient could request a second opinion. Because the patient’s health related
problem might potentially be serious, the doctor and patient cannot return to the initial
situation of their discussion; a lack of decisions about the health related problem is
extremely undesirable. Yet, the doctor and patient could start consultation again once
new starting points enter the discussion (such as the discovery of alternative treatment
options). An overview of the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in medical
consultation can be found in Figure 1.
5. A CASE IN POINT
Let me briefly illustrate how the characteristics of a medical consultation affect
argumentative discourse by an example taken from actual practice, Example 1. In this
fragment of a paediatric consultation, the parents (P M = mother; P F = father) of a toddler
with behavioural and developmental problems seek the professional advice of a
paediatrician (D = doctor). This is not the first time that they visited the doctor. In fact,
the doctor is about to report the results of tests on samples they collected earlier.
Example 1
Paediatric consultation (example obtained from the database compiled by the Netherlands
Institute for Health Services Research; my transcription and translation from Dutch)
1
2
3

D: Uhm, [to child] Mathilda, right? We’re just going to get you up to date…
P F : Yes.
D: because, of course, I’ve still got some results in a report for you here. And I’d of course like to
know some things from her. But shall I first inform you [parents] about the results? Uhm…
4 P F : Please.
[Doctor discusses results of various tests]
12 D: There’s, yeah, there’s a very small indication that there’s an anomaly in that [the child’s]
digestion, but they [the lab] say that we can only determine or see that if we take another blood
test.
13 P M : But that that doesn’t function well or, or, how do I uhm…
14 D: Roughly speaking, uhm, you do have to think about that. That there’s a small mistake somewhere
there in the digestion, which, uhm, could explain the problems. But, I’ve got to say, uhm, I think
it’s just an indication though. I don’t think like “Oh, now, great; we’ve found something and, uhm,
we can work with that.” I’m like “Well, yeah, it’s an indication” and I’m like, well, God, if you get
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such a test, and so you already did those steps, and if they advise that—and it’s a good bunch of
people that check that—then I’d be tempted to do that in any case.
17 P F : Yes.
18 P M : Yes.

In turns 12 and 14 of this fragment, the doctor indirectly advises the parents to let
their child undergo another blood test (“they [the lab] say that we can only determine or
see that, if we take another blood test” and “I’d be tempted to do that in any case”). From
the reasons that the doctor provides for this advice in turn 14 (“if you get such a test, and
so you already did those steps, and if they advise that—and it’s a good bunch of people
that check that”), it appears that the doctor assumes the parents are hesitant to follow her
advice—otherwise there would be no need for the presented argumentation. The
discourse can therefore be reconstructed as an argumentative discussion in which the
doctor acts as protagonist and the parents as antagonists.
The doctor clearly is in control of this discussion: in conformity with the
procedural starting point that the doctor acts as discussion leader, she determines which
topics will be addressed in what order. However, the doctor seems to realise that she
cannot just provide information and argumentation as she pleases, since that might come
across as impolite in the cooperative conversational exchange that she is engaged in. She
consequently actively includes the parents in the conversation by, for instance, directly
asking for their agreement in turn 3 (“But shall I first inform you [parents] about the
results?”). Simultaneously, by asking this question, the doctor announces she is about to
fulfill the requirement of obtaining informed consent.
Interestingly, the doctor uses the discursive means available to her in such a way
that she argues in favour of the medical advice by emphasising what she would
personally do in the parents’ situation. Because it is a material starting point in medical
consultation that the doctor can be regarded as an authority on the health related problem
under discussion, this appeal to ethos indicates that taking the blood test is the wise thing
to do. Additionally, the ethical appeal makes it strategically very difficult for the parents
to object to the advice. If they do, they would not only disregard the advice of the doctor
and laboratory, but also perform a direct face threatening act by disqualifying the doctor’s
non-professional behaviour. Indeed, the parents explicitly accept the doctor’s medical
advice in turns 17 and 18.
6. CONCLUSION
By analysing medical consultation as a pragma-dialectical communicative activity type, I
have attempted to show how this consultation affects the possible argumentative
discourse between a doctor and patient. Medical consultation can be regarded as a
communicative doctor-patient interaction in which the patient seeks the professional
advice of a doctor about a health related problem in assigned places (such as hospitals or
community health centres). This institutionalised communicative practice shapes the
discourse that occurs in it.
Due to, amongst others, the increased patient literacy on health issues and the
doctor’s increased professional liability, argumentation can play an important role in
medical consultation. The doctor cannot simply tell the patient what to do, but has to
convince the patient of his advice. The context of the medical consultation affects the
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manner in which the doctor does so. In a similar vein, it affects the way in which the
patient expresses possible doubt about or objections against the medical advice.
To adequately analyse and evaluate argumentative discourse in medical
consultation, specifying the preconditions for strategic manoeuvring by the doctor and
patient might prove useful. It does not only provide insight into the opportunities and
constraints that medical consultation offers for the argumentative discourse of its
participants, but can also be used as a starting point for determining the soundness criteria
for the evaluation of this discourse.
Link to commentary
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